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Robison: Constitutional Law - Free Press/Fair Trial - Pretrial Suppression

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE PRESs/FAIR

TRIAL- PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION HEARING MAY BE CLOSED IN ORDER TO PRESERVE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale (N.Y. 1977).

Gannett Co., owner of certain Rochester, New York newspapers, filed a
writ of prohibition' in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, seeking enjoinment of an exclusionary order entered by
a trial judge2 which barred the press and the public from a pretrial suppression hearing.3 The Appellate Division, in a per curiam decision, vacated
the lower court's order, 4 resting its decision on three related grounds. First,
the court found that the public's "vital interest" in open judicial proceedings
permitted a trial judge to close the courtroom only upon a showing of "compelling factual circumstances," which had not been made in the instant
case. 5 Second, the Appellate Division deemed the exclusionary order an
invalid form of prior restraint in that its effect precluded the press from
publishing information about the proceedings. 6 Finally, the court concluded
1. In New York, the remedy of prohibition is available when a judicial officer abuses his
discretion or acts in excess of his authority. N.Y. Civ. Pn~c. LAw § 7803 (McKinney 1963). For
a case in which prohibition was granted in order to prevent infringement of first amendment
freedoms, see Gannett Co. v. Mark, 54 A.D.2d 818, 387 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1976).
2. The trial judge was the Honorable Daniel De Pasquale. At the time the order was
entered, Judge De Pasquale was presiding over the unreported case of People v. Greathouse.
Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 375, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758
(1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1875 (1978). This criminal proceeding was of some notoriety in
the Rochester, N.Y. area, as it involved the alleged murder of a former policeman by a 16
year-old Texan and his 21 year-old traveling companion. 43 N.Y.2d at 375, 372 N.E.2d at 546,
401 N.Y.S.2d at 758. The trial judge based the exclusionary order on a finding that any adverse
publicity engendered by the hearing could be "prejudicial" to the defendants' sixth amendment
right to a trial by an impartial jury. Id. at 374, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
3. 43 N.Y.2d at 374, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758. Gannett Co., a national
media conglomerate, owns and operates two daily newspapers and one television station in the
Rochester, N.Y. area. Id. at 375, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758. One of the company's staff reporters was among those removed from the courtroom when the exclusionary
order was entered. Id.
Gannett alleged that the exclusionary order violated its first amendment right to gather and
disseminate news. Id. at 374, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758. The first amendment
provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is applicable to state action by
operation of the fourteenth amendment. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931). Gannett
further contended that the order violated the sixth amendment guarantee of a public trial. 43
N.Y.2d at 375, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758. The sixth amendment provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Shortly after the suppression hearing, the trial court entertained a motion to vacate the
closure order nunc pro tunc and to grant the press immediate access to the transcripts of the
proceedings. 43 N.Y.2d at 375, 372 N.E.2d at 546-47, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59. Judge De Pasquale refused to grant the requested relief, stating that the release of the transcripts would
deprive the defendants of "[a] meaningful opportunity to receive a fair trial." Id.
4. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976) (per curiam),
modified, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977) cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1875
(1978). The decision of the Appellate Division was unanimous.
5. 55 A.D.2d at 109-10, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 721-22.
6. Id. at 111, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 722. For a discussion of the concept of prior restraint, see
notes 21-23 and accompanying text infra.
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that entry of the exclusionary order, without notice and an opportunity for a
7
prior hearing, violated the petitioner's due process rights.
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals modified the judgment of
the Appellate Division, 8 holding that the public and the press may be
excluded from a pretrial hearing where publicity surrounding the proceeding
would threaten the court's ability to impanel an impartial jury for the subsequent trial. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544,
401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978).
The lack of a dispositive decision by the United States Supreme Court
on the constitutional validity of judicial closure orders, where the purpose of
such an order is to prevent the dissemination of publicity adverse to the
accused, 9 has led to divergent opinions among the courts 10 and commentators 11 as to their constitutionality.

7. 55 A.D.2d at 112, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 723-24.
8. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977),
cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1875 (1978). The Appellate Division's judgment was merely modified,
not reversed, because the court of appeals concluded that the questions presented had become
moot. 43 N.Y.2d at 376, 381, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 551, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759, 763. The case
became moot when the transcripts of the hearing were released to the press after the defendants pleaded guilty to lesser offenses contained in the indictment. Id. at 376 & n.1, 372
N.E.2d at 547 & n.1, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759 & n.I. The court retained jurisdiction over the case,
however, since it "crystallize[d] a recurring and delicate issue of concrete significance to both
the courts and the news media," and was of a character which "typically evade[d] review." Id.
at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
9. The fair trial/free press controversy is well over a century old. See United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C. Va. 1807) (defense lawyer arguing that adverse publicity has prejudiced jury against defendant Aaron Burr). The conflict is rooted in the tension that arises
between the competing constitutional claims of the press and the defendant during a criminal
prosecution. The press' claimed right is grounded upon the first amendment guarantees of a
free press, while those of the accused rest in the sixth amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For the pertinent
text of the first and sixth amendments, see note 3 supra.
A related issue is whether the public and press have an independent right of access to
judicial proceedings. See note 14 infra, Under the sixth amendment, the accused is guaranteed
the right to a public trial. For the pertinent text of the sixth amendment, see note 3 supra.
Whether this provision also confers a right on the public to observe criminal proceedings is a
matter of some controversy. See note 14 infra.
Supreme Court decisions in the fair trial/free press area do not deal directly with the issues
raised in Gannett. See, e.g., Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). In Oklahoma Publishing, the Supreme Court refused to
pass on the constitutionality of a state statute authorizing the closure of judicial proceedings. 430
U.S. at 310 (1977). The Court's limited holding was that a state court could not prohibit publication of information already in the public domain. Id. In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court
specifically left open the question of the constitutional validity of judicial orders closing pretrial
proceedings. 427 U.S. at 564 & n.8. In Sheppard, the Supreme Court held that due to the
atmosphere of prejudice created by the sensational trial and pretrial publicity, the defendant's
petition for habeas corpus should be granted. 384 U.S. at 363. In Estes, the Supreme Court
held that the televising of a trial was so inherently prejudicial to the defendant that reversal of
his conviction was compelled. 381 U.S. at 532-52. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 496 n.26 (1975); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct.
1606 (1978) (press may be excluded from bench conferences between judge and trial counsel in
light of governmental interest in preserving defendant's right to a fair trial); Phoenix Newspap-
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While courts have not clearly defined the extent of the constitutional
constraints applicable to closure orders entered at a pretrial suppression
hearing, the method of analysis likely to be employed in such a situation
ers, Inc. v. Winsor, 111 Ariz. 475, 533 P.2d 72 (1975) (to justify press and public exclusion from
preliminary hearing there must be a showing that the defendant would be so prejudiced that an
impartial jury could not later be impaneled); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz.
557, 490 P.2d 563 (1971) (public and press cannot be excluded from preliminary hearing where
defendant did not indicate that evidence inadmissible at trial would be introduced at the hearing); Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, Ark. , 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977) (public and
press should not be excluded from courtroom during voir dire); People v. Elliot, 54 Cal.2d 498,
354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960) (defendant's conviction reversed because trial judge,
having granted defendant's motion to exclude press and public from pretrial hearing, subsequently allowed reporter to enter and remain in courtroom); Stapleton v. District Court, 179
Colo. 187, 499 P.2d 310 (1972) (pretrial hearing should be closed where there is a substantial
likelihood that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be abrogated by open proceedings);
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 327 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. App. 1975) (not reversible error where trial
judge, with no objection by the defendant, closed pretrial suppression hearing in order to protect defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial); Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916
(1968) (state statute permits press and public to be excluded from preliminary hearing on defendant's request); Keene Publishing Co. v. Keene Dist. Court, N.H. -,
380 A.2d 261
(1977) (where press agreed not to release the names of any juveniles involved, press could not
be excluded from probable cause hearing); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977)
(evidentiary hearing should be held in camera only when there is a clear showing that disclosure may result in a serious and imminent threat to the integrity of the trial); People v. Pratt,
27 A.D.2d 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1967) (right of accused to a fair trial might require that the
press be excluded from a hearing on the voluntariness of an alleged confession); State v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976) (public and press should not be excluded from
pretrial suppression hearing); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, Pa. , 387
A.2d 425 (1978) (press and public properly excluded from pretrial proceeding where closure was
the only means of preserving defendant's sixth amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury):
See also United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973) (public and press should be
allowed to attend suppression hearing rather than permit such crucial steps in criminal process
to become associated with secrecy); United States v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1970) (press
and public should not be excluded from Jackson v. Denno hearing); Gooding v. Hooper, 394
F.2d 146 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 917 (1968) (federal court may not restrain state
criminal proceeding on mere supposition of injury to defendant; finding must be made that
harm would actually result); Times Newspapers, Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F.
Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (press may be excluded from taking of depositions); United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 388 F.2d
201 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968) (in anti-trust case pretrial hearing should
not be closed to public); State v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1975) (the public and the press
have a fundamental right of access to all judicial proceedings) (dictum); State v. McCrary, 328
So. 2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd sub nom. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla.
1977) (public may be excluded from a divorce proceeding); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282
N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972) (order excluding press and public from trial was unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights where no serious and imminent threat to
integrity of trial shown); United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954)
(right to a public trial is primarily that of the accused and thus may be waived if defendant
believes closed proceedings will preserve his right to a fair trial); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Disciplinary Board, 468 Pa. 382, 363 A.2d 779 (1976) (press may be excluded from reinstatement hearing of disbarred attorney).
For an excellent general discussion of this complex area of the law, see the dissenting
opinion of Justice Celebrezze in State v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 480-538, 351 N.E.2d 127,
141-74 (1976) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) and the concurring opinions of Justice Pashman and
Justice Schreiber in State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 146-78, 373 A.2d 377, 383-400 (1977) (Pashman,
J., concurring) (Schreiber, J., concurring).
11. Compare Comment, Fair Trial and Free Press: PreliminaryHearing-Gatewayto Prejudice, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 903 and Note, 39 ALB. L. REV. 317 (1975) with Note, 30 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1075 (1976).
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may be found in decisions addressing related issues in this area of the
law.' 2 For example, in United States v. Cianfrani,1 3 the Third Circuit
suggested that the sixth amendment guarantee of a right to a public trial
gives rise to a strong presumption that the public has the right to attend all
trials. 14 From this presupposition the court derived the principle that both
the public and the press have the right to attend a pretrial suppression hear12. The importance of the particular issues raised in determining the constitutionality of
closure orders entered at a pretrial suppression hearing is illustrated both by those cases in
which an appeal was heard notwithstanding the fact that the case had become technically moot,
and by those courts which have felt compelled to address this issue even though such discussion
was not necessary to the resolution of the particular legal question presented. See, e.g., United
States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 846 (3d Cir. 1978) (mootness); United States v. Gurney, 558
F.2d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1606 (1978) (mootness); State v. Allen,
73 N.J. 132, 142-46, 373 A.2d 377, 382-83 (1977) (not necessary for disposition of case). See note
8 supra.
13. 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978). In Cianfrani, the Third Circuit reviewed the constitutional
validity of an order entered by the trial court excluding the public and press from a pretrial
suppression hearing and sealing the record of that proceeding. Id. at 842. In this prosecution for
political corruption, the Government had filed a pretrial motion indicating its intention to offer
electronic recordings as evidence at the impending trial. Id. In response to the Government's
motion, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground, inter alia, that the
procedures employed by the law enforcement officials in intercepting the conversations constituted entrapment. Id. The defendant also requested that all proceedings concerning the intercepted communications be held in camera and that the resultant record be sealed. Id. at 843.
After affording the media an opportunity to oppose the defendant's motion, the district court
entered an order excluding the public and press from the pretrial hearings on the ground that
the congressional policy underlying Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), the federal statute authorizing and regulating the use of
electronic surveillance, protected against disclosure of the contents of any communication prior
to trial and prior to a determination that the communication had been lawfully intercepted. 573
F.2d at 843.
14. 573 F.2d at 847-54. The Cianfrani court noted that the issue of whether the sixth
amendment confers an independent right on the public to attend criminal proceedings is a
matter of some controversy. Id. at 851-54. Recognizing that the public trial requirement is for
the protection of the public as well as of the accused, the Third Circuit stated:
Though the sixth amendment by its terms guarantees a public trial only to the "accused," we believe that any deviation front the constitutionally established norm of open
proceedings implicates important societal interests. The policies identified by the courts
and commentators as underlying the public trial provisions of the sixth amendment serve
important societal interests that are often separate from-and in some cases antagonistic
to-the interests of a defendant in a particular criminal case. Because these larger interests underlying the sixth amendment are "of critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business"
... the decision to exclude the public from court should not be made without some
mention of these interests.
Id. at 852, quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975). See also United
States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1971); United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790 (W.D.Pa.), ret'd, 388 F.2d
201 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings,
107 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d 563 (1971); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257,
418 P.2d 594 (1966); Commercial Printing Co. v.Lee, Ark. , 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977);
State v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1975); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d
306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972); People v. Holder, 70 Misc. 2d 31, 332 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1972).
While the United States Supreme Court has never expressly determined that the public and the
press have an independent constitutional right to attend judicial proceedings, there appears to
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The Third Circuit grounded its reasoning upon the notion that the
has a compelling interest in keeping all judicial proceedings open, as
scrutiny insures both the fair and the efficient administration of jusConsequently, while concluding that a Federal statute allowed the

be a strong policy in favor of an open courtroom. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1975);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 614-15 (1965)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965).
In contrast, other courts have indicated that the right to a public trial is solely that of the
accused. See, e.g., Ceise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir, 1959); United States v.
Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949); Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968);
United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954); People v. Pratt, 27 A.D.2d
199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1967). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S, 532 (1965), where it was stated
that "the right of [a] 'public trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the
accused." Id. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949), the Third Circuit reasoned
that since the right to a public trial was intended to protect the accused from unfair prosecutions, the public has no cognizable contrary interest when the accused consciously waives this
right in order to preserve the impartiality of the proceedings. Id. at 722-23. Accord, United
Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 81-82, 123 N.E.2d 777, 780-81 (1954). However, in Cianfrani, the Third Circuit rejected much of the reasoning of Sorrentino as dictum. 573 F.2d at
852.
For a general discussion of the right to a public trial tinder the sixth amendment, see
Wiggins, The Public's Right to a Public Trial, 19 F.R.D. 25 (1955); Note, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
110 (1949); Note, 41 N.Y.U.L.REv. 1138 (1966).
15. 573 F.2d at 848-51. After noting that the "sixth amendment itself guarantees only an
open 'trial,' " and that there was conflicting authority as to whether a suppression hearing constitutes a "trial" for sixth amendment purposes, the court concluded that the pretrial hearing at
issue in Cianfrani fell within the ambit of the public trial requirement. Id. at 848-50. Accord,
United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973) (the right to a public trial should extend to
suppression hearings rather than permit such crucial steps in the criminal process to become
associated with secrecy); United States v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1969) (Jackson v.
Denno hearing has most of the characteristics of a trial and therefore public should not be
excluded from the courtroom during hearing); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (the right to a public trial should attach at the suppression hearing, since it is
frequently a critical stage of the criminal process). But see Lacaze v. United States, 391 F.2d
516 (5th Cir. 1968) (constitutional right to a public trial is not a limitless imperative) (dictum);
Commonwealth v. Harmon, 469 Pa. 490, 366 A.2d 895 (1976) (pretrial proceedings by definition
are distinguishable from the actual trial).
16. 573 F.2d at 850-51. The Third Circuit identified four factors which militate towards
granting the public and the press access to preliminary hearings. First, open proceedings "subject the judiciary to public scrutiny in the performance of its duties." Id. at 850. Second, open
proceedings encourage unknown individuals to come forward with relevant information. Id.
Third, access to all stages of a judicial proceeding provides the "appearance of justice" necessary
to foster public confidence in the courts. Id. Fourth, keeping suppression hearings open permits
the public to learn of police misconduct, thereby providing an opportunity to expose coercive
tactics and "invasion[s] of constitutionally and congressionally protected rights." Id.
A theory frequently advanced to justify granting the public a right of access to all judicial
proceedings is that without public scrutiny, the judiciary may abuse its power. For example, in
It re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), the Supreme Court stated: "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." Id. at 270. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (presence of press at trials protects against the miscarriage of justice);
United States v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969) (public scrutiny prevents judicial
oppression and discourages perjury). As the Cianfrani court noted, however:
As important as the actual prevention of judicial abuse or perjury at such hearings is
the preservation of the appearance of justice. Secret hearings-though they be scrnpu-
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trial judge to exclude the press and the public from that part of a pretrial
hearing where it was possible that unlawfully obtained evidence would be
disclosed, the Third Circuit held that the sixth amendment's public trial re17
quirement prohibited the exclusion of the public from the entire hearing.
In dictum in State v. Allen,' 8 *the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the high degree of protection that the first amendment has traditionlously fair in reality-are suspect by nature. Public confidence cannot long be maintained
where important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and then announced in
conclusive terms to the public, with the record supporting the court's decision sealed
from public view.
573 F.2d at 851. See generally 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 522-37

(London 1827); 3 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*372.

17. 573 F.2d at 854-59. The court determined that "any order of exclusion must extend no
farther than the circumstances strictly warrant in order to meet the asserted justification for
closure." Id. at 854, citing United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 725 (2d Cir. 1973).
While recognizing that the protection of privacy was a significant congressional concern during
the enactment of Title III, the Third Circuit concluded that the Act only prohibits disclosure of
the contents of communications that may have been intercepted in violation of the law. 573
F.2d at 857. The district court, however, in its "unusual reading of the provisions of Title III,"
bad erroneously closed the entire hearing and sealed the entire record. Id. Although the Third
Circuit recognized that "narrow and in many cases temporary restrictions on public access" to
proceedings are justified, it concluded that the trial court's broad order was constitutionally
infirm under the sixth amendment's public trial requirement. Id. at 858-59.
While it is clear that a defendant's right to a public trial is protected by the sixth amendment, it is also clear that this right is not absolute. Courts have frequently determined that the
exclusion of the public from the courtroom in particular factual situations, over the objection of
the defendant, does not violate this aspect of the sixth amendment guarantees. For example,
exclusionary orders have been upheld where their purpose is to protect a witness from intimidation or acute emotional trauma while testifying. See, e.g., United States v.Eisner, 533 F.2d 987
(6th Cir. 1976) (intimidation of witness); United States v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1970) (intimidation of sole witness by "gang" in courtroom); Harris
v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967) (testimony of rape
victim). See also United States v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct.
1266 (1978) ("curious" and "disinterested" spectators cleared from courtroom during testimony
of rape victim). Moreover, the public and the press have been excluded from the courtroom in
order to preserve the confidentiality of certain information. See, e.g., United States v. Vincent,
520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975) (public may be excluded in
order to preserve secret identity of undercover agent); Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co.,
506 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1974) (public may be excluded in order to protect confidentiality of trade
secrets); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972) (public
may be excluded from pretrial hearing during discussion of skyjacker profile).
In Cianfrani, the district court had also addressed the defendant's argument that closure of
the hearing was necessary in order to preserve his right to trial by an "impartial jury." United
States v. Cianfrani, 448 F. Supp. 1102, 1112 (E.D. Pa.) rev'd, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978). The
gravamen of the defendant's claim was that publication of prejudicial information disclosed at
the suppression hearing would influence potential jurors. 448 F. Supp. at 1104. While recognizing that there existed a "substantial likelihood" that publicized information would reach potential jurors, the trial court determined that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that potential
prejudice could not be avoided by alternatives to closure; such as voir dire, change of venue,
continuance, peremptory challenge, and sequestration of the jury. Id. at 1112. Following the
"instruction" of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the district court concluded that a judge may not close a pretrial hearing unless there exists a "clear and present"
danger to a fair trial, and unless it is established that alternatives to closure will be largely
ineffective. 448 F. Supp. at 1111-12. For a discussion of Nebraska Press, see notes 25-29 and
accompanying text infra. The Third Circuit apparently accepted the reasoning of the district
court on this particular issue. See 573 F.2d at 843, 851.
18. 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977).
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ally accorded the press. 19 After reviewing prior United States Supreme
Court decisions,20 the Allen court suggested that the judiciary would be precluded from imposing any form of prior restraint 2 l on the press unless the
22
moving party could overcome the heavy presumption against its validity.
Having determined that the closure of a pretrial hearing is tantamount to the
imposition of a prior restraint,2 3 the court concluded that an exclusionary
order would be invalid unless accompanied by a finding that there exists a
24
clear and present danger to the fair administration of justice.
19. Id. at 139-41, 373 A.2d at 380-81.
20. Id. at 139-43, 373 A.2d at 380-82. The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430
U.S. 308 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972). 73 N.J. at 139-43, 373 A.2d at 380-82. The court noted that Nebraska Press
and Oklahoma Publishing Co. did not address the issue of whether the press may be excluded
from a pretrial hearing in order to protect the defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. Id.
at 140-42, 373 A.2d at 380-81. For a discussion of Nebraska Press, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text infra. The court further noted that Branzburg dealt with this issue only tangentially. 73 N.J. at 142-43, 373 A.2d at 382.
21. One form of prior restraint on the press is a judicial order which attempts to preclude
the press from publishing material already in its possession. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Jerome, Pa. , , 387 A.2d 425, 432 (1978) ("A prior restraint prevents publication of information or material in the possession of the press and is presumed unconstitutional."). See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). Moreover, it has
been recognized that both indirect and direct restraints on publication can constitute a prior
restraint. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
390 (1973) ("The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed,
either directly or indirectly . . ., before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the
First Amendment.") (emphasis added); Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 522 (1977) ("[A]ny government action that significantly curtails the
dissemination of information and ideas prior to an adequate determination that the materials are
unprotected by the first amendment is a prior restraint.").
22. 73 N.J. at 139-40, 373 A.2d at 380. While prior restraints are not unconstitutional per
se, there exists a heavy presumption against their validity. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (gag order precluding press from publishing material already in the
public domain is invalid; heavy presumption against validity of order prohibiting publication of
information derived from other sources); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546 (1975) (movie licensing statute invalid form of prior restraint); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (government could not restrain publication of the "Pentagon
Papers"); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (court vacated injunction prohibiting distribution of literature which described real estate broker as a "blockbuster");
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (informal scheme of state sponsored censorship invalid form of prior restraint); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute which
permitted court to enjoin the publication of any "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" material, and an injunction issued pursuant thereto, constituted impermissible prior restraint).
23. 73 N.J. at 144, 373 A.2d at 382-83. The court stated: "From the standpoint of the press,
the in camera procedure, while not a direct restraint, arguably achieves the same result by
more subtle means and becomes in effect a prior restraint on the news gathering ability of the
press." Id. See also CBS, Inc, v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 1975) (gag order imposed
on all trial participants and their associates was invalidated as an "extreme example of a prior
restraint").
24. 73 N.J. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383. Accord, Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107
Ariz. 557, 561, 490 P.2d 563, 567 (1971); State v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 469, 351 N.E.2d
127, 135 (1976). Cf. Stapleton v. District Court, 179 Colo. 187, 499 P.2d 310 (1972) (preliminary hearing may be closed when there is a "substantial likelihood" that information prejudicial
to the accused's right to a fair trial would reach potential jurors); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Jerome, Pa. , 387 A.2d 425 (1978) (upholding validity of closure order entered at a
suppression hearing after determining that there was a "serious threat" to the fair administration
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Support for the reasoning suggested in Allen may be found in the
United States Supreme Court decision of Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart.25 In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court held that orders proscribing publication of matters transpiring in open court during'criminal proceedings are constitutionally infirm. 2 6 The Court also recognized that the special
protection accorded the press under the first amendment makes an order
prohibiting publication of information derived from sources other than public
proceedings presumptively invalid. 27 Thus, the Supreme Court stated that
before a court may impose a "gag order" 28 on the press, the requisites of
2 9
the clear and present danger test must at least be met.
of justice). See also Keene Publishing Corp. v. Keene Dist. Court, N.H. , 380 A.2d
261 (1977) (press should not be excluded from probable cause hearing, especially where it has
agreed not to release the names of juveniles involved).
In United States v. Cianfrani, 448 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir.
1978), the district court indicated:
A judge may not close to the public (including representatives of the news media) any
preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pretrial hearing in a criminal case, including a
motion to suppress, or seal any document unless the failure to close the proceeding or to
seal the document constitutes a clear and present danger to a fair trial in that: (1) There is
a substantial likelihood that information prejudicial to the accused's right to a fair trial
would reach potential jurors; and (2) the prejudicial effect of such information on potential
jurors cannot be avoided by alternative means. In assessing whether alternative means are
available, the court must consider whether the rights of the accused guaranteed by the
fifth and the sixth amendments can adequately be preserved through: (a) continuance: (b)
severance: (c) change of venue; (d) change of venire: (e) voir dire: (f) additional
peremptory challenges; (g) sequestration of the jury; (h) admonition to the jury, and (i)
other less restrictive procedures.
448 F. Supp. at 1111-12, quoting ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 3.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1977).
25. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
26. Id. at 568-70. In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court invalidated an order entered by
the Nebraska Supreme Court in a criminal proceeding which, while not as broad as the original
order entered by the trial judge in the case, nevertheless prohibited the publication of confessions, admissions and other information "strongly implicative" of the accused. Id. at 542. The
purpose of the order was to prevent the disclosure of prejudicial information "which would
make difficult, if not impossible, the impaneling of an impartial jury." Id. The press and public
were permitted to attend the defendant's preliminary hearing but, pursuant to the order, were
prohibited from reporting on what transpired in the courtroom. Id. at 543. In holding that this
"'gag order" violated the press' first amendment guarantees of freedom of expression, the Court
concluded that an order prohibiting press commentary on matters transpiring in open court was
"clearly invalid." Id. at 570. See id. at 568. For a discussion of what constitutes a gag order, see
note 28 infra.
27. 427 U.S. at 570.
28. A gag order is a court order which proscribes extra-judicial comments about ongoing
litigation. They are of two general types. The first type is placed upon the parties, their counsel, the witnesses, and/or the officers of the court. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 867 (1969). The second type is placed directly upon the news
media and usually prohibits the publication of matters prejudicial to the defendant, such as
records of past convictions and illegally obtained confessions. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974) (Powell, J., Opinion in Chambers), vacated as
moot, 420 U.S. 985 (1975); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
29. 427 U.S. at 562. According to the Court, the relevant inquiry in determining the constitutionality of a judicial order prohibiting press commentary on a criminal prosecution is
whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id., quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950); aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). In reaching this determination, the Court
noted that it:
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If an appellate court upholds a closure order designed to protect the
accused's sixth amendment right to a fair trial, it will probably adopt an
analysis paralleling that employed in United States v. Gurney.30 In Gurney,
the Fifth Circuit held, inter alia, that the press could be excluded from
bench conferences between the trial judge and counsel, and could be denied
access to documentary evidence not yet introduced at trial. 3 1 While noting
that the news media had a limited right to gather news, the court recognized
the existence of areas to which the public, and therefore the press, "traditionally have had no right of access." 32 Moreover, the court reasoned that
must examine the evidence before the trial judge when the order was entered to determine (a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures
would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how
effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger. The precise terms of the restraining order are also important. We must then consider whether
the record supports the entry of a prior restraint on publication, one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence.
427 U.S. at 562. While recognizing that the trial judge was justified in concluding that there
would be "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity concerning this case," the Court noted that
the judge found only "a clear and present danger that pretrial publicity could impinge upon the
defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. at 563 (emphasis supplied by the Court). According to the
Court, the trial judge's conclusion as to the "impact of such publicity on prospective jurors was
of necessity speculative, dealing as he was with factors unknown and unknowable." Id.
Moreover, the Court noted that the trial judge made no express findings to the effect that
the defendant's right to a fair trial could not be preserved by alternatives to closure, such as
change of venie, postponement of the trial, extensive voir dire of the jury, and jury sequestration. Id. at 563-64. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme
Court sustaining the constitutionality of a modified version of the order. Id. at 570.
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, Pa. , 387 A.2d 425 (1978), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, having determined that an order excluding the press and public
from a pretrial hearing does not constitute a form of prior restraint, concluded that Nebraska
Press does not control the determination of the scope of the press' right of access to suppression
hearings. Id. at ,
, 387 A.2d at 432, 434. However, the court applied the rationale of
Nebraska Press in sustaining the validity of the state rules of criminal procedure which authorized the closure orders at issue. Id. at -- , 387 A.2d at 435-40. First, the court found that
there was a substantial threat to the defendants' right to a fair trial, as knowledge of information
disclosed at pretrial suppression hearings often leads to public predetermination of the accused's
guilt. Id. at -,
387 A.2d at 435-36. Second, the court explicitly determined that such procedural safeguards as change of venue, jury sequestration, and voir dire would be ineffective in
preserving the defendants' sixth amendment rights. Id. at -,
387 A.2d at 438. Finally, the
court recognized that by "precluding prejudicial disclosures arising from pretrial suppression
hearings," a court promotes "the speedy and effective enforcement of the criminal laws, ensnre[s] swift convictions, . . . and avoid[s] unnecessary expenditures of public funds and judicial
resources" on delayed trials and retrials. Id. at -,
387 A.2d at 436.
30. 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1606 (1978).
31. 558 F.2d at 1210-11.
32. Id. at 1208-09. As the court noted, the press and public "have historically been excluded
from sensitive governmental activities such as grand jury proceedings, judicial conferences ...
and in camera inspections of evidence." Id. at 1209 (citations omitted). While recognizing that
"such denials of access hamper newsgathering," the court concluded that "fundamental governmental interests and protection of other rights . . . override the concerns of the public" and
the burdens imposed on the press. Id.
The Gurney court's recognition that newsgathering warrants some degree of first amendment protection, however, is supported by Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974) (newsgathering has some first amendment protection).
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (freedom of the press would be eviscerated
unless the right to gather news qualified for some degree of first amendment protection). As one
federal court has stated: "It is apparent that the First Amendment right to publish news must
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since the media's right of access to sources of information has been deemed
to be coextensive with that of the general public, 33 the press may be denied
access to information where it would be appropriate to exclude the public at
34
large.
The Fifth Circuit also suggested that the public, and therefore the
press, may be excluded from those judicial proceedings in which their presence would unduly impair the defendant's right to a fair trial or would interfere with the efficient administration of the adjudicatory process. 35 While
acknowledging that such a result would operate to deny the press access to
desired information, the Fifth Circuit indicated that such exclusionary orders
implemented the legitimate government interest of securing for the accused
36
the fair trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
The reasoning adopted by the Gurney court is similar to that employed
by the Supreme Court in Pell v. Procunier.37 In Pell, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a California Department of Corrections regulation 38 which prohibited face-to-face interviews between reporters and certain prison inmates. 39 In its analysis, the Court recognized that the media's
logically include to some degree a right to gather news fit for publication. Freedom to publish
news, without some protected ability to gather it, would render freedom of the press an unduly
gossamer right." Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 775 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (emphasis supplied
by the court). However, while courts have recognized the media's right to gather news, it is
clear that this right is not absolute. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The right to
speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.").
Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 1967) (the right to gather news is not
unconditional); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 775 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (while there is a first
amendment right to gather news, the right is, of necessity, a limited one).
For general discussions of the nature and the scope of the media's right to gather news, see
Comment, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Comment, Newsgathering: Second Class Right Among
First Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEx. L. REV. 1440 (1975); Comment, The Right of the Press to
Gather Information after Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. Pa. L. REV. 166 (1975).
33. 558 F.2d at 1208, citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977).
34. 558 F.2d at 1209.
35. Id. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972) ("[Newsmen] may be prohibited
from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to insure
a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.") (dictum) (emphasis added).
36. 558 F.2d at 1269-11. Accord, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, Pa. -,
387 A.2d 425 (1978); Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968).
For a discussion of the effects of pretrial publicity on juror prejudice, see Simon, Does the
Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on
Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977). In that article, the author concludes:
"Experiments to date indicate that for the most part juries are able and willing to put aside
extraneous information and base their decisions on the evidence." Id. at 528. But see
PADAWER-SINGER & BARTON, The Impact of PretrialPublicity on Juror's Verdicts, in THE JURY
SYSTEM IN AMERICA 123 (R.Simon ed. 1975). This empirical study suggests that pretrial publicity can have serious effects on jurors. Id.
37. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
38. The regulation being challenged was § 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual issued pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058 (West 1970). It provided: "Press
and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted." 417 U.S. at
819. The provision was promulgated after prison officials determined that the former policy of
unrestricted personal interviews resulted in certain inmates gaining "a disproportionate degree
of notoriety and influence" in the prison community. Id. at 831.
39. 417 U.S. at 827-28.
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right to gather news is defined in terms of the public's right of access to
information, stating: "The Constitution does not require [the] government to
access to information not shared by members of the
accord the press special
0
public generally." 4
Against this background, the Gannett court 4' began its analysis by stating that the public's right to access to criminal trials must be balanced
against the right of the accused to a fair trial. 42 Recognizing the inherent
power of the court to protect the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, the majority determined that neither the public nor the press has an
43
absolute right to be present at all stages of a judicial proceeding.
Turning to the particular factual situation presented, the court emphasized the fact that the closure order was entered at the pretrial stage of
the proceedings. 44 According to the majority, the presiding judge has the
power to exclude the public from pretrial suppression hearings in order to
45
prevent public predetermination of the accused's guilt or innocence.
Moreover, the court suggested the propriety of judicial action to insure that
evidence inadmissible at trial does not become public knowledge, since public disclosure of tainted evidence would "involve the court itself in the ille46
gality."
The majority then reviewed the options available to a trial judge "to
stem improper revelation of facts that would present an imminent threat to
the impaneling of a constitutionally impartial jury." 4 7 The court noted that
Nebraska Press virtually precluded the courts from imposing a gag order on
the press.48 The court distinguished the present case from Nebraska Press,
however, by noting that the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question
as to the constitutionality of "Ic]losing ... pretrial proceedings with the consent of the defendant." 49 The majority thus concluded that trial courts have
not been prohibited from excluding both the press and the public from pretrial suppression hearings where pretrial publicity threatens the impaneling
of an impartial jury. 50 Indeed, the court stated that where'press commen40. Id. at 834. See notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
41. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978). Judge Wachtler wrote the opinion for the majority. Judge
Cooke wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judge Fuchsberg joined. 43 N.Y.2d at 388, 372
N.E.2d at 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
42. 43 N.Y.2d at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60. The court emphasized
that the right to a public trial is primarily that of the accused, Id.
43. Id. at 376-77, 372 N.E.2d at 548, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
44. Id. at 378-80, 372 N.E.2d at 549-50, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 761-62.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
47. Id. at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 549-50, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762. The court suggested that change
of venue, continuance, and extensive voir dire "may prove paltry protection for precious rights."
Id. at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
48. Id. at 379-80, 372 N.E.2d at 549, 401 N.Y. S.2d at 761-62. For a discussion of Nebraska
Press, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
49. 43 N.Y.2d at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762, quoting Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 n.8 (1976).
50. 43 N.Y.2d at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
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tary rises to a level at which it "would threaten" the defendant's right to a
51
fair trial, pretrial hearings "are presumptively . . . closed to the public."
Finally, the majority acknowledged the right of the news media to challenge judicial closure orders. 52 The court suggested that such an attack may
succeed where the public has an "overwhelming interest" in keeping the
judicial proceeding open, and cited as an example a criminal prosecution in
which the defendant is a public official. 5 3 In contrast, the majority noted
that where the interest of the public is merely one of "active curiosity with
respect to a notorious local happening," it was more likely that the trial
54
court could validly close the proceeding.
In a dissenting opinion, judge Cooke disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Nebraska Press.5 5 The dissent stated that any distinction
56
drawn between a gag order and a closure order was "without substance."
Comparing the effect of the issuance of a closure order and the imposition of
a gag order on the press' ability to disseminate information, the dissent asserted that each is essentially, a form of prior restraint. 5 7 Consequently,
judge Cooke concluded that the closure order may be upheld only if it overcomes the heavy presumption against its validity. 58 In the present case, the
dissent argued, the defendant had failed to sustain the burden of showing
the "abject necessity" of the closure order, and had failed to demonstrate
that "alternatives to closure cannot insure a fair trial. '59 Indeed, the dissent
posited that the majority had improperly shifted the burden of proof to the
press by requiring that the media demonstrate the "magnitude of any
genuine public interest" in the controversy. 60
The dissent concluded by rejecting the argument that the right to a
public trial is waivable at the option of the accused. 6 1 As the dissent observed, "since the right of a public trial knows no correlative right to a
private one," it is improper for a judge to close a proceeding merely upon
62
the request of the defendant.
It would appear that the New York Court of Appeals correctly analyzed
some aspects of the competing constitutional claims at issue in Gannett. In
response to the newspaper's claim that it had a sixth amendment right to

51. Id.
52. Id. at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court stated that where a proceeding is closed, any true public interest could be
satisfied by supplying the media with edited transcripts of the hearing. Id. , 372 N.E.2d at
550-51, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762-63.
55. 43 N.Y.2d at 383-87, 372 N.E.2d 552-54, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 764-66 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
See notes 48-50 and accompanying text su pra.
56. 43 N.Y.2d at 384, 372 N.E.2d at 552, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 765 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 385-86, 372 N.E.2d at 553-54, 401 N.YS.2d at 766 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
59. 43 N.Y.2d at 387, 372 N.E.2d at 554, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 386, 372 N.E.2d at 554, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 766 (Cooke, J., dissenting). See text
accompanying note 53 supra.
61. 43 N.Y.2d at 387-88, 372 N.E.2d at 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (Cooke, j., dissenting).
62. id.
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attend the evidentiary proceedings, the majority properly recognized that
the right to a public trial belongs primarily to the accused. 63 A literal reading of the Constitution supports this conclusion. 64 Moreover, if one accepts
the proposition that public access to criminal proceedings fosters the public's
interest in the fair enforcement of its laws, 65 then it would seem logical to
exclude the public, and therefore the press, from those proceedings in which
66
their presence could lead to a miscarriage of justice.
Furthermore, there are strong policy reasons for denying the press access to pretrial suppression hearings. For example, a defendant may feel
compelled to forego his right to challenge illegally obtained evidence out of
fear that premature disclosure of inculpatory evidence will reduce his
chances of receiving a fair trial. 6 7 Further, in cases of particular notoriety,
alternative measures usually available to reduce the effects of prejudicial
publicity, such as changing venue, may be largely ineffective. 6 8 Finally,
knowledge by the jury of information disclosed at pretrial suppression hearings frequently leads to the reversal of criminal convictions, 69 which result in

63. Id. at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 760. See note 42 and accompanying text
supra. See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Geise v.
United States, 265 F.2d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1959).
64. The sixth amendment explicitly grants the right of public trial to the accused: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added).
65. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
66. Accepting the strong judicial policy in favor of open proceedings, see note 14 and accompanying text supra, it is nevertheless submitted that any cognizable independent public
right of access to criminal proceedings should be limited by the right of the accused to receive a
fair trial. Indeed, as was stated in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), "[t]he law . . . favors
publicity in legal proceedings, so far as that object can be attained without injustice to the
persons immediately concerned." Id.

at 542, quoting 2 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-

TIONS 931-32 (Carrington ed. 1927) (emphasis added).
In a concurring opinion in Allen, Justice Schreiber determined that the constitutional guarantee of a free press was predicated upon a right to "criticize" and not upon a right to "know." 73
N.J. at 172-73, 373 A.2d at 397 (Schreiber, J., concurring). Consequently, he concluded that
the press may be excluded from a pretrial hearing in order to preserve the defendant's right to
a fair trial provided that a record of the proceeding is eventually released to the press. Id. at
178, 373 A.2d at 400 (Schreiber, J., concurring). The press will then be able to perform its
"watchdog" function by critiquing the conduct of the participants of the hearing. Id.
67. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, Pa. , 387 A.2d 425, 436 (1978)
("Such pressure to forego a constitutional right denies due process").
68. Id. at
, 387 A.2d at 438-39.
69. Id. at
, 387 A.2d at 435-36. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
(murder conviction reversed due to carnival atmosphere created by trial and pretrial publicity);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (trial court erred in denying change of venue where
accused's confession had been repeatedly televised in area from which jurors were drawn); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (conviction reversed where jurors read newspaper
accounts of defendant's criminal record). As Justice Frankfurter once observed:
Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had in
States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial has
been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts . . . exerting pressures upon
potential jurors before trial and even during the course of trial, thereby making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to secure a jury capable of taking in, free of prepossessions, evidence submitted in open court.
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See note 36 supra.
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costly retrials at a time when the evidence may have become stale. The
probability of a correct determination of guilt or innocence is thereby reduced while the costs of administering justice rise.7"
Despite the strengths of the majority opinion, it is submitted that it
contains several analytical weaknesses. The majority failed to recognize that
a prior restraint may occur in many different forms. 71 Courts have recently
determined that a direct restriction on the press' right of publication is not
the sole means of imposing a prior restraint upon the news media. 72 As the
dissent in Gannett correctly observed, infringement of the media's freedom
of access to newsworthy information is a subtle, yet effective means of re73
stricting its freedom to convey information about a controversial matter. It
would thus appear that the first amendment concept of freedom of the press
necessarily includes not only the freedom to convey information, but also the
freedom to gain access to information. Consequently, a restraint on either
the right to publish news or the right to gather news may be considered a
74
form of prior restraint.
Moreover, it is submitted that the majority failed to apply the correct
standard in determining whether the closure of the suppression hearing was
constitutionally permissible. In Gannett, the majority stated that pretrial
proceedings may be closed upon a mere showing that press commentary
"would threaten" the impaneling of an impartial jury. 7 5 As the dissent
noted, restrictions on the press' first amendment rights should not be imposed on this basis since "in cases of notoriety it will always be possible to
show some risk of prejudice."-7 6 It is, therefore, submitted that there
should be a factual finding of compelling necessity before any judicial proceeding is closed to the press and the public. 77 Compelling necessity
should only be found where: 1) there is an imminent danger that the
defendant cannot receive a fair trial due to pretrial publicity; and 2) alternative measures for insuring a fair trial would be largely ineffective. 78
Furthermore, the majority not only applied an incorrect standard of
proof in determining the validity of the exclusionary order, but also inappropriately shifted the burden of proof to the press. The Gannett court
stated that the press can successfully attack an exclusionary order, entered to
70. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, Pa.
, 373 A.2d 425, 436
(1978).
71. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
72. Id.
73. 43 N.Y.2d at 384, 372 N.E.2d at 552, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 765 (Cooke, J.,dissenting).
74. See note 32 supra; notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
75. 43 N.Y.2d at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762. See text accompanying note
51 supra.
76. 43 N.Y.2d at 386, 372 N.E.2d at 553, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 766. (Cooke, J.,dissenting).
77. See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 861 (3d Cir. 1978); notes 14-16, 21-24 &
27-29 and accompanying text supra.
78. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-65, 570 (1976); United
States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 854, 861 (3d Cir. 1978); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 145, 373
A.2d 377, 383 (1977); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, Pa.
,387 A.2d
425, 435-38 (1978).
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preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial, when it demonstrates the existence of an overwhelming public interest in a proceeding. 79 In light of
Nebraska Press, however, it is submitted that before a prior restraint can be
imposed on the press, the defendant must establish that the requisites of the
clear and present danger test have been met.8 0
Relevant precedent suggests that the United States Supreme Court may
reverse the New York Court of Appeals. The imposition of the burden of
proof upon the press and the failure of the trial judge to predicate his
exclusionary order on a finding of clear and present danger to the fair administration of justice appear inconsistent with prior decisions in this general
area of the law. 81
If the the Supreme Court reverses Gannett, but limits its holding to the
particular factual situation presented, the decision might not provide the
courts with the guidance necessary to resolve the difficult constitutional
questions raised in these cases. If, however, the Supreme Court renders a
decision in which it makes a broad pronouncement as to the constitutionality
of judicial closure orders, where the purpose of such an order is to protect a
defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial, then the case will be
"landmark," as it will resolve the current ambiguities in this area 82 of the
law.
Douglas Robison

79. 43 N.Y.2d at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 763. See text accompanying notes
52 & 60 supra.
80. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 75-80 and accompanying text supra.
82. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
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